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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes central bank policies on the monitoring of banks in distress in which 
liquidity provisions are conditional on performance when a bad shock occurs. A sequential 
game model is used to analyze two policies: the first one in which the central bank acts with 
discretion and the second in which the optimal monitoring policy rule is made public. The 
results show that banks exert less effort and take higher risks with a discretionary monitoring 
policy. With public information about monitoring rules, there is more central bank monitoring 
and less need to provide emergency funding. Public information about monitoring resolves 
the multiple equilibria that arise with discretion in fact, a unique equilibrium emerges in 
which the probability of a banking crisis is reduced. 
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Non-technical Summary 
 
In response to the current financial crisis and the recent reconsideration of the responsibilities 
of the central bank not only during crises but also to prevent them, this research designs an 
optimal policy for the provision of emergency funding to financial institutions (or commercial 
firms) in distress. It emphasizes the importance of monitoring by the central bank when 
liquidity provisions are given conditional on performance and not only on a bad shock 
occurring. I compare two central bank policies. Under the first policy, the central bank acts 
with discretion (taking an ex-post action to particular circumstances) when deciding on the 
level of liquidity provision and monitoring after the shock occurs and agents make decisions. 
Under the second, the optimal levels of monitoring are determined so as to minimize both 
moral hazard problems (i.e. problems created when agents behave differently than when they 
are fully exposed to risk) and liquidity provision costs, have rule-like features, and are made 
public information before shocks to the economy occur. Understanding that the behavior of 
policymakers may conceivably be inconsistent over time, it is crucial that monitoring and 
liquidity provision policies are not only made public but institutionalized so that the central 
bank can enforce the rule and be obliged to monitor private-sector agents, and avoid 
discretionary decisions. 
 This paper finds that when the policy rules are made public information, thus resolving 
any potential uncertainty about the monitoring policy, it is optimal for the central bank to 
monitor more and provide lower emergency funding than when the central bank acts with 
discretion. Such rules-based policy will also i) effectively allow the regulator to implement 
conditionality and determine which bank or firm is the deserving candidate to obtain liquidity; 
ii) cause financial and commercial firms to exert higher effort to increase productivity and 
take lower risks; and iii) dissuade policymakers from implementing discretionary policies and 
being inconsistent over time. 
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I show that a discretionary policy does not resolve private agents’ uncertainty regarding 
the level of monitoring, and it does not necessarily induce good behavior among financial and 
commercial firms. This is mainly because the decisions of private agents are in this case taken 
as given by the central bank when determining its policy. This discretionary policy 
unmistakably describes the recent actions taken by different governments to rescue financial 
firms in distress. Policymakers have suddenly found that it is urgent to make emergency 
funding available in different ways to financial institutions. At the same time, there are now 
also calls for tougher or new regulations and supervision. These ex-post measures have not 
avoided and will hardly avoid future moral hazard problems. Moreover, it is far from clear 
that the financial institutions now receiving emergency funding deserve it, or whether 
measures are being taken in an orderly manner. 
By institutionalizing the public feature of the central bank’s optimal monitoring policy 
before private decision makers form expectations, the central bank is enabled to effectively 
impose conditions when providing liquidity. The roles of the central bank as both Lender of 
Last Resort (LOLR) and supervisor are linked as follows. As an LOLR, it should have 
incentives to engage in monitoring that is sufficient to reduce moral hazards and able to 
provide assistance only to deserving banks. If the central bank is unable to follow its 
announced policy publicly, then its only option is to act with discretion. This latter situation 
may perhaps describe the different current rescue polices of different governments in the 
aftermath of the recent financial crises. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The handling of financial crises is now at the top of the agenda for economists and 
policymakers alike. Worldwide, we have recently experienced a large number of bank failures 
as well as the provisions of massive emergency funding from central banks to financial 
institutions in distress. These events are forcing analysts to reconsider the role and 
responsibilities of central banks or regulators in general.1 Should the central bank or the 
relevant regulator have the authority and responsibility to write and enforce rules to achieve 
financial stability over time? Or should instead the central bank or the regulator take 
corrective actions only when it finds it necessary? How can the central bank or regulator 
decide which banks should be allowed to fail? Much of the discussion on these issues is, 
indeed, crucial and controversial. An optimal course of action must aim in any case to avoid 
both crisis and moral hazard, and as such, choosing an optimal or efficient course of action is 
extremely complicated. 
There is currently much disagreement in the Economics profession about what is an 
optimal policy; in the meantime, unorthodox policy measures are taken on an ad hoc basis. 
The economic analyses on ex-post measures have so far only centered on the type of policy 
that should be implemented to resolve such crises once they have occurred. For example, 
studies look at the effects of government assistance (e.g., liquidity provisions) or other 
mechanisms (e.g., regulations) without any conditionality with regard to the ex-post 
resolution of financial crises. Other studies include conditionality in their analyses but still 
encounter time-inconsistency and moral hazard problems. This is not surprising, since it is 
well known that discretionary policies can risk exacerbating moral hazard problems. Some 
studies analyze the ex-ante measures that aim to prevent such crises by focusing on the role of 
                                                 
1 This paper does not deal with the division of labor and power between different regulators. This is an 
interesting and relevant topic and we will study it in another research paper. 
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the BIS and its Basel Accords, while others focus on the effect of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. The Basel II Framework 
describes a measurable minimum standard for capital adequacy, which is intended to 
guarantee a solid international financial architecture and to help avoid systemic risk. The 
FDICIA of 1991 mandates annual, full-scope examinations of banks by regulators. Note that 
these regulatory examinations and audits are predicated on the basis of the information that 
ratings-based classifications, such as CAMELS ratings, reveal about a bank’s true financial 
health, and not on basis of a direct evaluation by the relevant regulators themselves. How 
informative CAMELS ratings are in assessing a bank’s financial condition is an open 
question, see Greenbaum and Thakor (2007) and Gasbarro, Sadguna and Zumwalt (2002). 
Studies analyzing government ex-ante commitments to specific measures if a crisis occurs, 
have generally come to reach two contradictory conclusions. First, ex-ante commitments face 
time-inconsistency problems, and secondly, the lack of commitment by governments induces 
a bank behavior (i.e., moral hazard) that increases the likelihood of systemic banking crises. 
This paper shows that moral hazard problems, even in the presence of conditionality, will 
always arise with ex-ante or ex-post measures if there is no mechanism for monitoring or 
supervision. We in addition find that a monitoring policy that is optimal, made public and has 
rule-like features will i) effectively allow the regulator to implement conditionality and 
determined which financial institution is the appropriate candidate to obtain liquidity 
provisions and ii) dissuade authorities from implementing discretionary policies and avoid 
time-inconsistency problems. These are important and new results in the financial market 
context, and should be taken into account in the literature that considers both the resolution 
and prevention of financial crisis. The theory of monetary policy has indeed dealt with similar 
problems and debates when focusing on the potential trade-offs between short-run increases 
in output and maintaining a credible commitment to low and stable inflation (see Plosser 
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(2009)). To our knowledge, the theories of financial crisis resolution are not yet taking the 
lesson learned from such theory: specifying in advance the conditions or states of the world 
under which the central bank will intervene is an essential first step. We pursue that here. 
As in Holmstrøm and Tirole (2001), the central bank is here assumed to have the 
opportunity to conditionally provide outside liquidity to enable a troubled institution to fulfill 
its obligations toward its depositors and investors and keep its charter. To apply conditions on 
performance before emergency liquidity is provided, it is here imperative that the central bank 
implement a monitoring mechanism if it aims to assist only the banks that truly require and 
deserve such assistance. The monitoring mechanism is a key concern of this paper. We first 
consider a case in which the central bank acts with discretion and determines ex-post the 
optimal monitoring level. In the second case, the central bank decides and makes public the 
optimal monitoring level before banks make decisions. The latter policy reduces the scope of 
discretionary policies and uncertainty about the central bank’s actions. The paper then 
compares these two cases by focusing on the moral hazard effects of the two policies. 
Note that making public the rule for monitoring, as in monetary economics modeling, puts 
pressure on the central bank to provide emergency funding to only the deserving banks (i.e., 
banks without moral hazard problems) and to let those banks engaged in moral hazard fail, 
even if it is ex-post optimal to let them continue. 
The model considers the sequence of optimal decisions of the central bank and banks as 
well as the outcomes under discretionary and public monitoring policies. To study such 
dynamics, a three-stage, sequential game model is used in which the optimal strategies are 
found through backward induction. The degree of monitoring is endogenously derived from a 
well-specified objective function of the central bank. The model also takes into account bank 
behavior first, with regard to ex-post discretionary decisions and, second, with regard to 
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public information about monitoring policy. Banks have well-specified objective functions as 
well.  
The most important results are as follows. First, with a discretionary policy, there will be 
self-fulfilling expectations and multiple equilibria, including “good” and “bad” equilibria. The 
“bad” equilibria are associated with (self-fulfilling) expectations that there will be little or no 
monitoring when a bad shock occurs. The “good” equilibria are associated with expectations 
that there will be high levels of monitoring, independent of a shock. In the bad equilibria, 
there will be significant moral hazard problems and greater needs for emergency funding. 
Second, when the monitoring policy rule is made public, in the event of a bad shock, the 
optimal solution is one in which the central bank monitors more. In this case, moral hazard 
problems and each bank’s probability of becoming insolvent are reduced because risk-taking 
behavior is ameliorated. There will be then much less need for emergency funding. 
The research of Perotti and Suarez (2002) and Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007, 2008) is 
closely related to our work. They proposed certain types of ex-post central bank assistance 
policies and regulations conditional on performance. Perotti and Suarez (2002) considered the 
effect of implementing discretionary policies on bank entry and merging during banking 
crises conditional on the risks that competing banks have taken. They conclude that with such 
policies, banks can be motivated to behave prudently in order to be able to take over the 
business of failed banks. Such a result, however, depends on the crucial assumption that there 
is not ex-ante uncertainty that such discretionary policies will be implemented when banks 
make decisions on risk. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) model the effects of so-called “too-
many-to-fail” guarantees as an ex-post policy, while Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) 
consider ex-post liquidity provision policies for surviving banks aimed at allowing these 
banks to acquire failing banks. They emphasize that the behavior of banks depends on their 
expectations of the regulator’s future polices. They do not consider, as we do here, any 
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monitoring policy. They find that the ex-post bailout policies give banks incentives to have 
herding behavior (Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007)) and have highly correlated portfolios 
(Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008)), thus increasing the risk of having many banks failing 
together ex-post, encouraging “too-many-to-fail” guarantees from the central bank. They also 
discuss the case in which the regulator wishes ex-ante to implement the ex-post optimal 
guarantee policies and yet induce a low correlation among banks. They conclude that such ex-
ante regulation is time-inconsistent which as they argue, arises when the regulator faces 
extremely high liquidity provision costs ex-post due to the bank failure rate being very high. 
An important issue is the application of their analysis to financial problems such as the one 
that we are experiencing now. One needs not only to weigh the costs of providing liquidity 
with the costs of letting financial institutions fail, but also the role that monitoring will play in 
reducing such costs. Our model is careful in considering this balance. 
In contrast to the papers above, in this paper the regulator’s decisions aim to minimize the 
costs of bank bailouts and bank foreclosures even when it acts with discretion. Moreover, in 
the case in which it makes the monitoring policy public, its optimal decisions are ones that 
minimize not only the above costs but also moral hazard problems. This is possible because 
the regulator takes into consideration bank reactions to regulations when making optimal 
decisions. Public knowledge of the monitoring policy at an early stage is essential and, 
moreover, provides solutions to agency problems. All parties, including the central bank, will 
then play by the rules, with moral hazard and time-inconsistency problems minimized. The 
objective is to reduce the incidence of financial crises rather than merely provide an optimal 
level of emergency liquidity. This is an important contribution that has not yet been 
considered in the relevant literature. 
Another related work is by Goodhart and Huang (2005), who explicitly represent the 
classic “social cost-moral hazard” trade-off. They show that the central bank has incentives to 
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provide Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) assistance when concerns about the contagious effects 
of crises are weighted more strongly than moral hazard considerations. They do not examine 
polices adequate for addressing moral hazard problems. Freixas (2000) finds that depending 
on the characteristics of the bank’s balance sheets and the social cost of bank failure, the 
optimal policy may be either a systematic bailout using discretion or a mixed strategy; the 
latter provides a theoretical foundation for the “constructive ambiguity” doctrine (i.e., the 
adoption of ambiguous policy in response to a financial crisis). The analysis of this paper 
moves away from “constructive ambiguity” by making monitoring information public in order 
to resolve uncertainties. Cordella and Yeyati (2003) find that the ”constructive ambiguity” 
approach often recommended to attenuate moral hazard is always dominated by a policy in 
which the LOLR announces with certainty that it will rescue failing banks conditional upon 
an adverse aggregate shock. This conditionality is, however, not set based on bank behavior, 
as we do here. Monitoring is not either considered. Mailath and Mester (1994) look at 
incentives for a distressed bank to invest in excessively risky projects and show that when 
regulators cannot commit to future actions, forbearance arises as an equilibrium outcome. 
Note that they do not present solutions to moral hazard and agency problems as we do here. 
Indeed, schemes for assisting banks in distress can make the probability of surviving less 
dependent on each bank’s choice of risk, and more dependent on the central bank’s assistance. 
In contrast to the above papers, our model not only seriously considers that any liquidity 
provision be made conditional on the occurrence of a bad shock as well as on bank 
performance, but it also demonstrates that central bank monitoring is necessary to reduce 
moral hazard problems and bank failures. Discretionary policies cannot eliminate the 
uncertainty about a regulator’s future policies, and in general do not induce good bank 
behavior. Again, a better outcome is obtained when the monitoring policy becomes public 
information. 
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Section 2 presents the economic environment. Section 3 derives the optimal decisions of 
banks, while Section 4 explains the central bank’s problem. Section 5 describes the three-
stage, sequential game-theoretical model. Section 6 presents the solution for the equilibrium 
in which the central bank acts with discretion. The case in which the central bank makes its 
monitoring policy public knowledge is presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The economic environment 
We present a three-stage, sequential game in which the players include the central bank and 
the private banks. At the last stage of the game, a shock occurs. This could be a bad shock, b, 
or a good shock, g, which occurs with probability q and (1 – q), respectively. Thus, in the bad 
state, b occurs and banks face negative returns and liquidity problems unless there is no 
central bank assistance. In the good state, g occurs and banks’ returns are positive.  
Banks make decisions about their amount of risky investment and effort to screen 
investments and pay sufficient attention to risk management. We say that a bank has moral 
hazard problems if it engages in excessive risky investment and exert low effort because it 
expects to receive financial assistance but not to be monitored in the bad state. Our world here 
has two groups of banks, and in each group, banks are heterogeneous. Of the total population 
of banks, n1 banks are always transparent and never have moral hazard problems. This group 
of banks is called T for transparent. The rest of the banks, n2, behave strategically: they will 
have moral hazard problems and be less transparent in the absence of sufficient incentives. 
This group of banks is called S for strategic. The focus here is on differentiating between the 
behaviors of banks in groups T and S, and we consider the decisions of banks in group T as 
our benchmark for the socially optimal risk-taking. Our analysis focuses on determining how 
different decisions banks in group S may become from those of banks in group T a result of 
central bank policies. 
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Returns on each individual bank’s investments are not directly observable. The probability 
distribution of the returns in the population of banks in groups T and S can, however, be 
observed. Financial assistance by the central bank is always conditional on the fact that a bank 
is not detected as type S when a bad shock, b, has occurred. To recognize bank type, the 
central bank needs to engage in monitoring, denoted by m. The idea behind imposing such 
conditionality is to penalize insolvency when there are moral hazard problems. When an S 
bank reports its losses and searches for assistance, the central bank can only recognize with 
probability ρ(m) to which return distribution the bank belongs to, and ρ’(m) = dρ/dm > 0.2 
We consider two types of monitoring policy. With the first type, the central bank acts with 
discretion, in which case bank actions are taken as given when determining the optimal level 
of monitoring intensity, m. Note that this also means that the central bank takes as given the 
return distributions. The second type is one with which the monitoring policy is made public 
before banks form expectations and make decisions. It is only in this case that the central 
bank’s optimal decisions about m aim to influence the bank decisions and return distributions. 
As we will see, the central bank’s roles as monitor and LOLR are interrelated: monitoring 
is relevant when liquidity provision is needed. The characteristics of this interrelationship 
depend on whether monitoring rules are publicly established at an early stage or not. 
 
3. The bank’s problem 
    Each bank decides on its optimal amount of risky investment, L, and effort, e. Unless the 
central bank makes public its monitoring policy, banks make optimal decisions on the basis of 
their expectations about future shocks and the central bank’s policies on monitoring and 
liquidity assistance. 
                                                 
2 Since banks in group S are transparent, they can be always recognized its type not matter the level of m. 
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     Optimal investments of both types of banks, LT and LS, are less profitable in the bad state 
than in the good state. In the good state, a bank j belonging to group T, will obtain a positive 
returns RgT(j) (j=1,…,n1), while if bank i belongs to group S, it will obtain a positive returns 
equal to RgS(i) (i=1,…,n2). However, when b occurs, banks in group T will obtain negative 
returns RbT(j), they will receive liquidity assistance since they have no moral hazard problems 
and are highly transparency, independent of the degree of central bank’s monitoring. Banks in 
S, will achieve negative returns RbS(i), but their possibilities of receiving liquidity however, 
depend on the central bank’s intensity of monitoring. When these banks are found to have 
moral hazard problems, they will not receive emergency funding and will lose their charters. 
 
3.1 Banks’ optimal decisions are independent of the liquidity provision policy  
     Banks in group T, our benchmark banks, make decisions about their investment, LT, and 
effort, eT. Each of them (j=1,…,n1) maximizes the following expected net return function 
E(RT), where the j subscript is dropped to remove formula redundancy: 
( ) ( ) ( ), (1 ) , ( )T T T T T T T T Tb gE R qR L e q R L e C e= + − − .                       (1) 
The return functions, RbT and RgT, are concave in the control variables, LT and eT. CT(eT) is 
the cost function of effort which is concave and increasing, satisfying CeT > 0 and CeeT ≥ 0. 
The optimal level of eT that maximizes (1) is determined from the following first-order 
condition: 
 , ,(1 )
T T T
b e g e eqR q R C+ − = .                    (2) 
    Without loss of generality, we assume that bank returns are an increasing function of effort 
for a given LT, that is, Rg,eT > 0 and Rb,eT > 0. At the optimal level of effort, the expected 
marginal return of effort equals the marginal cost of effort. 
The optimal level of LT that maximizes (1) is determined from the following first-order 
condition: 
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,
,
(1 ) 0
T
b L
T
g L
R q
qR
−⎡ ⎤= − <⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ .                  (3) 
The left-hand side in (3) is the ratio between the marginal returns at the optimal investment LT 
in the bad (Rb,LT) and good (Rg,LT) states, respectively. Now, since the returns are only 
negative in the bad state for every j=1,…,n1, the marginal return at the LT will only be 
negative in the bad state (Rb,LT < 0) and positive in the good state (Rg,LT > 0). 
 
3.2  Banks’ optimal decisions depend on the liquidity provision policy 
    The emergency funding that the central bank provides could be only a fraction Φ [Φ є (0, 
1)] of banks’ net losses or negative returns.3 Each of the banks (j=1,…,n2) that belong to 
group S will maximize the following expected net return function E(RS): 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )
(1 )(1 ( )) , ( ) ,
(1 ) ,
S S S S S S S
b b
S S S S S
g
E R q m R L e m R L e
q R L e C e
ρ ρ= −Φ − + +
− −
 .                     (4) 
The return functions, RbS, RgS, and cost function CS(eS) are here also concave and well 
behaved. At a certain monitoring intensity, m, there is a probability (1 – ρ(m)) (ρ(m)) that a 
bank will not (will) be detected as a member of group S. In the event of a bad shock, b, (4) 
indicates that with probability q(1–ρ(m)), banks in S will face losses equal to (1-Φ)RbS(LS,eS) 
after receiving emergency funding, but equal to RbS(LS,eS) with the probability q(ρ(m)). 
 
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, for a given eS, m, and Ф, the equilibrium amount of risky 
investment will be higher for banks in group S than in group T. The returns will consequently 
be more negative in the bad state for banks in S than for banks in T. 
                                                 
3 There will then be recapitalization up to an optimal standard in accordance with the central bank’s objectives. 
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Proof of Proposition 1 
Maximizing (4) with respect to LS yields the following first-order condition for LS: 
 ( ),,
(1 ) 0
1 (1 ( ))
S
b L
S
g L
R q
R q mρ
⎡ ⎤−= − <⎢ ⎥−Φ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 .             (5) 
 (5) is similar to (3), except that now Φ and ρ(m) affect the ratio in (5). For given expected 
emergency funding (i.e., given level of Φ) and level of monitoring m by banks, the marginal 
return at the optimal solution LS is more negative for banks in S than the marginal return at the 
optimal solution LT for banks in T. That is, Rb,LS < Rb,LT which implies that LS > LT, and that 
returns will be more negative for banks in S than for those in T in equilibrium ■ 
 
Proposition 2 For a given eS, m, and Ф, the equilibrium level of effort will be lower for 
banks in S than for banks in T. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Maximizing (4) with respect to bank effort, eS, the first-order condition for eS will be:  
     ( ), ,(1 (1 ( )) (1 )S S Sb e g e eqR m q R Cρ−Φ − + − =  .                   (6) 
Note that Rg,eS  > 0 and Rb,eS > 0. For a moment, let the marginal cost of effort for banks in S, 
CeS, be equal to the marginal cost of effort for banks in T, CeT. For a given anticipated Ф and 
m, Rg,eS  and Rb,eS  will be higher for banks in S than for banks in T at the equilibrium level of 
effort, eS. Therefore, eS < eT. These results are also confirmed by taking into account that CeS 
is likely higher than CeT since banks in S have moral hazard problems ■ 
 
Corollary 1 The moral hazard problems of banks in S worsen (are reduced) if it is expected a 
low (high) level of monitoring, m, and high (low) level of liquidity provision, Φ: 
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• When an increase in Ф is anticipated, the S banks will choose a higher level of risky 
investment, LS. If in addition, m is expected to be low, moral hazard problems will 
worsen, and LS will be even higher. 
From (5), liquidity provisions affect LS as follows: 
,
, ,
(1 ( ))
0
[1 (1 ( ))] (1 )
SS
b L
S S
b LL g LL
q m RL
q m R q R
ρ
ρ
−∂ = >∂Φ −Φ − + − .      (7) 
Since RbLS < 0 from (5) and Rg,LLS < 0, Rb,LLS < 0 by the concavity of the return functions. 
 
• Expectations of lower m will increase the level of risky investment, LS. 
Considering (5), monitoring intensity will affect LS, as follows: 
,
, ,
'( ))
0
[1 (1 ( ))] (1 )
SS
b L
S S
b LL g LL
q m RL
m q m R q R
ρ
ρ
− Φ∂ = <∂ −Φ − + − .      (8) 
• The greater the expected Φ is, the lower the effort eS will be. eS will be further reduced if 
lower levels of m are expected, in which case the moral hazard problems will worsen. 
From (6), Φ will affect eS as follows: 
  ,
, ,
(1 ( ))
0
[1 (1 ( ))] (1 )
SS
b e
S S S
b ee g ee ee
qR me
q m R q R C
ρ
ρ
−∂ = <∂Φ −Φ − + − − .     (9) 
Higher anticipated levels of Φ will decrease effort, since Rb,eS > 0, Rg,eeS < 0, Rb,eeS < 0 
based on the strict concavity assumption of the return function, and CSee > 0 due to the 
strict convexity of the cost function for effort. 
 
• Expectations of lower m will decrease the amount of effort exerted, eS. 
Considering (6), the intensity of monitoring will affect eS as follows: 
,
, ,
'( )
0
[1 (1 ( ))] (1 )
SS
b e
S S S
b ee g ee ee
q m Re
m q m R q R C
ρ
ρ
− Φ∂ = >∂ −Φ − + − −  ■  (10) 
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Corollary 2 An anticipated higher (lower) liquidity provision Φ and lower (higher) 
monitoring m, results in smaller (larger) returns when a bad shock occurs as a result of moral 
hazard problems. 
Such effects can be seen by analyzing (5) and (6). When banks expect larger Ф and lower 
m, (5) will be more negative. Thus, in the bad state, the marginal return on a risky investment 
will be lower which implies higher LS. (6) indicates that expectations of larger Φ and smaller 
m results in a larger marginal return on effort in the bad state and therefore a lower effort ■ 
 
The returns across banks in each group have distributions with means TgR (> 0), 
S
gR (> 0), 
T
bR (< 0), and 
S
bR (< 0) with corresponding variances, all of which is public information. Bank 
characteristics and decisions, as described above, determine the return distributions. Figure 1 
illustrates possible return distributions when a bad shock occurs for banks in T (on the right) 
and S (on the left).  
 
Figure 1. Distributions of returns in the bad state across banks in T and S 
Return distribution of banks in S                  Return distribution of banks in T  
            
            
            
            
  mean     
S
bR      Rb*      
T
bR         mean   
     
Note that if banks in S expect decreases in Ф and/or increases in m, the distribution of 
returns of banks in S will shift to the right (see Corollary 2). This means that the average 
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returns of banks in S, SbR , will increase and be close to the average returns of banks in T,
T
bR . 
Thus, expressions (5) and (6) become closer to (3) and (6) respectively, and banks in S will be 
more similar to banks in T. In such a case, there will not be banks with moral hazard problems 
and all banks will be qualified to obtain financial assistance when needed.4 If the return 
distributions are as above, and a bank requests financial assistance having a return equal to 
Rb*, the central bank will need to monitor in order to find out to which return distribution this 
bank belongs.  
The main conclusion at this point is that optimal decisions and final returns of banks in S 
depend not only on expectations regarding the types of shocks that may occur, but also about 
the central bank’s decisions regarding monitoring and emergency funding. Expectations of 
low levels of monitoring and high levels of emergency funding will induce banks to have 
portfolios with a larger number of risky investments and to exert less effort, which only 
means more moral hazard problems. 
It is worthwhile to remark already here, as we show below, that the return distribution of 
banks in group S will be necessarily affected when the central bank makes public the 
monitoring policy. That is, it shifts the return distribution of banks in S toward the right and 
consequently increasing SbR . This contrasts the case in which the central bank acts with 
discretion with regard to monitoring because in such a case, the return distributions are taken 
as given by the central bank.  
 
4. The central bank’s problem 
Recall first that the central bank can only observe TbR  and
S
bR . The central bank’s payoffs 
in the event of good and bad shocks are Wg and Wb, respectively. 
                                                 
4 Notice also the limit case in which there is not overlapping of the return distributions at all. In this case, the 
central bank can more easily distinguish the bank type with any level of monitoring. 
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The payoff Wg requires no further attention here, since in the good state there should be no 
banking failures, and the central bank will be passive. Wb, however, is influenced by the 
optimal choices of Ф and m. Wb will depend on the functions V, Ψ, and Ω: 
( , ) [ )] (1 ( )) [ ]
0
. .
0.
T S
b b b
BC
W m V m R m R m
s t
m
ρ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥Φ = Φ +Φ −Ψ Φ + − Φ −Ω⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
Φ >⎧⎨ ≥⎩
	

      (11) 
In (11), V(Φm+Φ) indicates that the central bank derives certain value from Φ and m. If Φ 
is zero, monitoring, m, does not contribute to increasing V, no matter how big m is. 
Monitoring is only important when emergency funding (i.e., Φ > 0) is provided, in order to 
identify the deserving banks. A nonzero Φ however, contributes positively to the central 
bank’s value V and its payoffs, even when m = 0, because by providing liquidity to troubled 
banks, the central bank avoids systemic risks and liquidity shortages. Nevertheless, when Φ is 
nonzero, the central bank will derive a higher value of V if m > 0 because, through 
monitoring, the central bank will have a higher probability of correctly recognizing to which 
return distribution a bank belongs. This is socially desirable. 
Ω(m) is the central bank’s indirect costs of monitoring which is concave and increasing. 
The provision of liquidity is also costly not only because it involves larger fiscal costs and/or 
higher costs to the taxpayers but also because scarce resources may be given to non-deserving 
banks. These costs are represented by functionΨ. Ψ is a convex function increasing in BC 
[=Ф TbR + (1-ρ(m))Ф
S
bR ]. For a given m, Ψ increases as average bank returns become more 
negative. The term (1-ρ(m))Ф SbR  can be viewed as the penalty to the central bank for 
providing emergency liquidity with inadequate monitoring, especially when m and ρ(m) are 
low. 
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5. A three-stage sequential-game theoretical model 
The sequential game is solved using backward induction. The timeline for the model is 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Stage 1  
At this stage, the following factors become known: the probability distribution of the 
returns of banks in T and S, the probability distribution of the type of shock that will occur in 
the last stage, and the probability distribution of detecting the bank type at each different level 
of monitoring, given known return distributions. At this stage, the central bank also 
announces that it will either act with discretion when deciding policies about monitoring, or it 
makes public its policies on monitoring.  
 
Figure 2. Timeline: the three-stage sequential game  
           
            t=1                      t=2                           t=3 
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Stage 2 
At this stage, banks make their optimal decisions. After the central bank announces that it 
will act with discretion, banks must form expectations about the type of shock that will occur 
at the last stage of the game, while only banks in S must in addition form expectations about 
the monitoring before making optimal decisions. In contrast, if the central bank makes its 
monitoring policy public at stage 1, bank uncertainty about future central bank decisions is 
resolved at this stage. 
Stage 3 
    During this stage, either b or g occurs, and only the central bank moves. The possible 
outcomes depend on whether it has decided to act with discretion or to make public its 
optimal monitoring policy. If the central bank has decided to act with discretion, it takes as 
given bank decisions when maximizing its payoffs. However, when the central bank has made 
public knowledge its optimal monitoring policy, its optimal decisions will affect bank 
decisions and minimize the moral hazard problems of banks. This is possible because the 
central bank takes into consideration the reaction of banks to information on monitoring 
policy, instead of taking bank actions as given when maximizing its payoffs. 
    
6. Equilibrium when the central bank acts with discretion 
The optimal decisions about monitoring intensity, m, and liquidity provisions, Φ, are 
determined at stage 3. The possible sub-game equilibria are found through backward 
induction. 
 
Lemma 1 If banks in S do not expect to be monitored by the central bank, they will have 
greater moral hazard problems and more negative returns than when they expect monitoring. 
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Proof of Lemma 1 (5) and (6) from section 3.2 above are modified to take into account the 
case in which monitoring is not expected: 
( )
,
,
(1 ) 0
1
S
b L
S
g L
R q
R q
⎡ ⎤−= − <⎢ ⎥−Φ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
;    (5a) 
( ), ,1 (1 )S S Sb e g e eqR q R C−Φ + − = .    (6a) 
By comparing (5) with (5a) and (6) with (6a), it is clear that if banks expect to receive 
emergency funding but not to be monitored, the amount of risky investment will be higher, 
and effort will be lower. This will lead to more negative individual and average returns in the 
bad state across S banks (see Propositions 1 and 2), which means that the incidence of 
banking failure will increase. These large negative average returns are denoted by SbR  (< SbR )■ 
 
Lemma 2 In the absence of monitoring by the central bank, the optimal level of liquidity 
provisions will be lower. 
Proof of Lemma 2 Using (11), the central bank’s payoff function in the absence of 
monitoring in the bad state is: 
( ,0) [ ] ( )T Sb b b
BC
W V R R
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥Φ = Φ −Ψ Φ +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 	
 .        (12) 
The first-order condition for Φ that maximizes (12) is: 
N N N ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
[ ] [ ] ( ) 0T Sb b b
dW BCV V R R
d BC BCΦ Φ −− − −
∂Ψ ∂ ∂Ψ= Φ − • = Φ − • + =Φ ∂ ∂Φ ∂
 	
 .      (13)     
Now, if the returns of S banks are now SbR < SbR , the marginal value of providing liquidity, 
VФ, must increase to restore equilibrium. For this to happen, the optimal Φ must be smaller. 
Thus, the central bank does not benefit from providing liquidity if it does not monitor. Let us 
denote this optimal equilibrium level byΦ ■ 
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Lemma 3 As bank losses increase, the central bank will only provide more liquidity if it 
engages in sufficient monitoring. 
Proof of Lemma 3 The optimal level of Φ is obtained from the following first-order 
condition, which maximizes (11): 
N ( )
( )
[ )] ( (1 ( ) ) 0T Sb b b
dW V m R m R
d BC
ρΦ
−−
∂Ψ= Φ +Φ − • + − =Φ ∂ 	
 .    (14) 
For a given level of m (and ρ(m)), VΦ should increase when the average returns become more 
negative in order to satisfy the first-order condition which implies that Φ should decrease. 
Note, though, that for the same increase in bank losses, the central bank will provide more 
liquidity if the amount of monitoring increases. Moreover, at the highest level of m, ρ(m) is 
close to one and the central bank will only incur in the costs of providing liquidity to banks in 
T. Thus, the lower the monitoring, the more expensive becomes to provide liquidity. The 
central bank however aims to minimize such costs ■ 
Lemma 4 Monitoring by the central bank will increase as bank losses become larger. 
Proof of Lemma 4 
The central bank’s optimal solution for m is found by maximizing (11) with respect to m. 
Thus, m can be solved from the following first-order condition: 
  ( )
N N N( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
) ( ) '( ) 0Sb m m b
dW V m m m R
dm BC
MgC of monitoring
ρ
+ −++ −
⎡ ⎤∂Ψ⎢ ⎥= Φ +Φ − Ω − × Φ =⎢ ⎥∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
	
	

	

.        (15) 
The optimal level of m is found when the marginal value of monitoring, Vm, equals the total 
marginal costs of monitoring, ( ) '( ) NSm bMgC m m RBC
ρ⎛ ⎞∂Ψ⎡ ⎤= Ω − × Φ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ . If the average S bank 
returns becomes more negative than NSbR , the central bank’s total marginal costs of 
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monitoring, MgC, will decrease. The attainment of a new equilibrium (i.e. (15) holds with 
equality) must reflect the value that the central bank derives from monitoring, Vm. Thus, Vm 
must decrease to establish a new equilibrium, which means that m should increase ■ 
 
Proposition 3 If the central bank acts with discretion when banks expect emergency 
funding but do not expect to be monitored, the central bank’s best response to such 
expectations is not to monitor.  
Proof of Proposition 3 
Banks in S cannot rationally make optimal decisions under the assumption that they will be 
monitored if in fact they do not expect to be monitored. They understandably believe that 
there is not risk of having moral hazard problems and requesting emergency funding. Notice 
also that when banks do not expect to be monitored, the average return for S banks when a 
bad shock occurs is negative and equal to NSbR (see Lemma 1). This is the smallest possible 
value for average returns which will result in the smallest liquidity provision by the central 
bank:Φ , in order to satisfy the first-order condition (13) (see Lemma 2) ■ 
 
Corollary 3 When the central bank acts with discretion and banks do not expect to be 
monitored; there are two possible non-cooperative, Nash equilibria. These are illustrated in 
Figure 3 below. At Node (1), none of the banks is monitored, but when a bad shock, b, occurs, 
all banks receive emergency funding because the central bank is unable to recognize to which 
of the two return distributions each bank belongs. At Node (2), the central bank does not need 
to monitor or provide liquidity when a good shock, g, occurs. 
The intuition behind Node (1) in Corollary 3 is self-explanatory from Proposition 3. Node 
(2) is explained by the fact that the central bank is passive in the good state. In this state, 
there is no need for central bank intervention ■ 
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Proposition 4 If the central bank acts with discretion and banks expect to be monitored, 
then the central bank’s best strategy is to monitor banks.  
Proof of Proposition 4 
When monitoring is expected by S banks, they will determine optimal levels of risky 
investment and effort always according to (5) and (6) and never according to (5a) and (6a). 
Otherwise, they will face the risk of becoming ineligible to receive emergency funding if a 
bad shock occurs. Also, when a bad shock occurs, such optimal decisions will yield average 
returns across these banks equal to NSbR >
NS
bR . In this case, the optimal level of Φ will be 
determined according to (14), where Φ >Φ . Thus, the more monitoring is expected by banks, 
the less negative will be the average returns and the larger will be amount of the emergency 
funding, Φ ■ 
 
Figure 3. Possible outcomes in the three-stage sequential game when the central bank 
acts with discretion 
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     t=1     t=2                       t=3 
 
The main conclusions are as follows. First, banking crises can be driven by self-
fulfilling expectations about the monitoring policy, resulting in multiple equilibria. For 
example, if banks expect no monitoring, a rational central bank will not monitor them. 
Second, higher levels of liquidity provisions are only justified with higher levels of 
monitoring. Thus, at the Nash equilibrium in which the central bank engages in monitoring, 
financial assistance will be larger, but fewer banks in S will wrongly receive such assistance 
in comparison to the Nash equilibrium in which there is no monitoring. Third, there will 
always be uncertainty about the level of monitoring, and the final equilibrium depends on 
bank expectations about monitoring. 
The analysis above raises the following questions. How can the central bank implement a 
policy that resolves the uncertainty that banks have about monitoring? What would that policy 
be? Would such a policy induce good bank behavior and avoid the multiple equilibria 
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dilemma found above? Would that policy put beneficial constraints on the central bank to act 
with discretion? The next section attempts to answer these questions.  
 
7. Equilibrium when the central bank makes its monitoring policy public  
The discretionary policy described above does not eliminate uncertainty regarding the 
level of monitoring, and it does not necessarily induce good behavior among financial 
institutions, mainly because their actions are taken as a given by the central bank when acting 
with discretion. The discretionary model in section 6 unmistakably describes the recent 
actions taken by governments around the world to rescue financial firms in distress. It has 
become suddenly urgent to make emergency funding available in different ways to financial 
institutions. At the same time, there are also calls for tougher or new regulations and 
supervision. These ex-post measures have not avoided and will hardly avoid further moral 
hazard problems. Moreover, it is not entirely certain that the financial institutions now 
receiving emergency funding deserve it, or whether measures are being taken in an orderly 
manner. 
This section analyzes the case in which the central bank makes public its optimal 
monitoring policy, thereby eliminating multiple equilibria that arise when there is uncertainty 
about the monitoring policy, resolving moral hazard problems and reducing the scope of time-
inconsistency problems. Such a policy also enables the central bank to impose conditions 
when providing liquidity. The implementation of such a policy requires the 
institutionalization of the monitoring regulations through which the central bank can enforce 
its rule. The central bank will be then obliged to monitor and avoid discretionary decisions. 
Before this model is formally presented, the timeline of events described in Figure 3 must 
be reviewed in order to consider the nature of publicly announcing a monitoring policy. The 
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central bank must make public its optimal level of monitoring5 at the first stage of the game, 
before banks make decisions and form expectations, which occur at stage 2. The roles of the 
central bank as both LOLR and supervisor are linked as follows. If the central bank stands as 
an LOLR, it should have incentives to engage in monitoring that is sufficient to reduce moral 
hazards and able to provide assistance only to deserving banks. At the outset, it should be 
understood that if the central bank is unable to make public its policy, then the only option for 
the central bank is to act with discretion. This latter situation may perhaps describe the current 
stance of the rescue polices around the world in the aftermath of the recent financial crises. 
    Here, the central bank must take into account the following: 
i) There is a probability, q, that the central bank will incur the costs of providing 
emergency funding and monitoring if b occurs in the last stage of the game. This 
means that there will be a probability, q, that the central bank will face a payoff equal 
to Wb (see (11)) at stage 3. 
ii) The intensity of monitoring affects the capacity to detect which banks have moral 
hazard problems. 
iii) A higher (lower) liquidity provision and/or lower (higher) monitoring intensity 
increases (decreases) moral hazard problems of S banks. These problems reduce 
(increase) the individual and average returns for these banks in the bad state. These 
issues have been addressed in Propositions 1 and 2 and in Corollary 1.  
   Let us find the central bank’s optimal decisions on liquidity provisions and monitoring at 
stage 1 in anticipation of b. Since the central bank is passive in the good state, it is only 
relevant to consider the central bank’s maximization of the payoff function, Γb = q{Wb(·)}: 
{ }[ , ] (1 ( )) ( )C C C NS C C NS Cb b bq V m R m R mρ⎡ ⎤Γ = Φ −Ψ Φ + − Φ −Ω⎣ ⎦ .    (16) 
                                                 
5 One can call this supervision, but the main idea is that authorities must be transparent about it. 
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 ΦC and mC represent the optimal liquidity provisions and monitoring intensity that the central 
bank will announce at stage 1 to maximize (16). Note that the central bank makes its optimal 
decisions regarding ΦC and mC taking into account how banks would respond to its decisions. 
    By maximizing (16) with respect to ΦC, the following first-order condition is obtained: 
      N N
( ). . .(14)
(1 ( )) 0;
S
b
S
C Cb b b
C C
BC
f o c R
moral hazard effects of
d dW dRm or
BC dd d
ρ
∂−= ∂
Φ
Γ ∂Ψ= − − Φ =∂ ΦΦ Φ i i	

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.  (17b) 
      The optimal level of monitoring is determined by solving the first order-condition with 
respect to mC: 
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.      (18b) 
Proposition 5 When optimal policies are made public at stage 1, the central bank’s optimal 
decisions should include offering a smaller liquidity provision and more monitoring than 
under a discretionary policy in order to ameliorate moral hazard problems. If moral hazard 
problems are not a concern for the central bank, liquidity provisions and the level of 
monitoring should be the same as under a discretionary policy.  
Proof of Proposition 5 
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The central bank faces the same first-order conditions with respect to liquidity provisions and 
monitoring when it acts with discretion (compare (14) against (17), and (15) against (18)), and 
additional factors that the central bank must consider if it wants to reduce moral hazard 
problems. These include: first, the effect of providing liquidity on the moral hazards of banks 
(i.e., the last term in (17)) and, second, the effect of monitoring on the moral hazards of banks 
(i.e., last term of (18)). These latter effects can either decrease or increase the central bank’s 
marginal payoffs, but this depends on the signs that d SbR /dФ
C and d SbR /dm
C take. Corollary 2 
indicates that in the presence of moral hazard, anticipated increases in liquidity provisions 
and/or decreases in monitoring intensity will yield lower returns for S banks in the bad state. 
As a consequence, the mean of these returns will also decrease; that is, d SbR /dФ
C < 0 and 
d SbR /dm
C > 0. These inequalities indicate that the return distribution for S banks shifts to the 
left when a bad shock occurs, which only means that higher Φ and lower m have adverse 
effects (see Figure 1).  
Thus, if d SbR /dФ
C < 0, in order to satisfy (17), dWb/dΦC must increase, and this is only 
possible if liquidity provisions decrease. However, if d NSbR /dm
C > 0, then (18) will be 
satisfied if (dWb/dΦ) decreases, and this is only possible if monitoring intensity increases. 
The central bank will therefore monitor more and provide less emergency liquidity to 
ameliorate moral hazards as much as possible ■ 
The conclusion is that if the central bank publicly announces its policies at a very early 
stage before banks make their decisions that there will be high levels of monitoring, it will 
effectively resolve bank uncertainty over ex-post realizations. Such a policy has the following 
desirable effects: (i) it resolves the dilemma of multiple equilibria and instead achieves a 
unique equilibrium that is only contingent on the type of shock, e.g., only Nodes (3) and (4) 
from Figure 3 are attained; (ii) it increases the possibilities for less risk-taking and more 
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effort, thus increasing bank returns and reducing the risks of banking crises; and (iii) it 
minimizes the need for providing emergency financing. Thus, the public announcement of 
monitoring allows the central bank to effectively condition any liquidity provision on a bank’s 
performance.  
These are important contributions to the relevant literature. Our model illuminates the 
limitations of monitoring with discretion in comparison to a public monitoring policy. 
 
8. Conclusions 
This model analyzes the relationships between a central bank’s decisions regarding 
liquidity provisions and monitoring policy and private bank behaviors. The model is presented 
as a three-stage sequential game. The recapitalization of a bank occurs only to the extent that 
it maximizes the central bank’s objective function. This recapitalization is conditional on a 
bad shock occurring at the last stage of the game and on bank decisions not being adversely 
dependent on the liquidity provision policy itself (i.e., not showing any moral hazards). There 
are two groups of banks. T banks are always transparent and never have moral hazard 
problems, while S banks are not transparent and are generally prone to moral hazard 
problems, especially when they expect very little or no monitoring. When the central bank 
acts with discretion, the potential for bank insolvencies and moral hazard problems cannot be 
reduced, nor can the uncertainty for S banks be resolved. This leads to multiple, non-
cooperative Nash equilibria. However, if the central bank makes public the fact that there will 
be high levels of monitoring before banks make optimizing decisions, it can effectively 
ameliorate the risk-taking behavior of banks as well as increase bank efforts. 
Thus, the main results can be summarized as follows. First, when the central bank acts 
with discretion and no monitoring is expected, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium implies 
that the central bank chooses not to monitor, in which case such expectations become self-
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fulfilling. When a bad occurs, all banks will receive emergency financing since they will be 
indistinguishable from each other. Such an outcome implies a worst-case scenario for moral 
hazard: namely, risky investment increases, and effort decreases. Second, when the central 
bank acts with discretion and banks expect to be monitored, there will be another non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium at which the central bank’s best strategy is to monitor the banks 
and provide higher liquidity than when there is no monitoring. The more monitoring, the 
fewer banks will wrongly receive liquidity provisions. Here again, when acting with 
discretion, uncertainty about monitoring is never resolved, and since expectations are always 
self-fulfilling, there is never a guarantee that there will be sufficient monitoring to avoid 
inefficiencies. Third, if the central bank announces early enough the optimal level of 
monitoring that maximizes its payoffs, it will reduce the need for liquidity provisions as well 
as decrease moral hazard problems. Such a measure reduces bank insolvencies. 
Note that making known the central bank’s monitoring policy will eliminate time-
inconsistency problems because there will most likely be greater pressure on the central bank 
to provide emergency financing only to deserving banks. This suggests the institutionalization 
of monitoring rules such that whenever it is necessary to provide liquidity, it is mandatory to 
apply the announced monitoring policy.  
Thus, one of the main conclusions in this study is that in order to provide banks the best 
ex-ante incentives, the central bank should monitor more and make its monitoring public 
knowledge in order to have the most desirable effects on bank behavior. The recommendation 
is that the central bank should avoid acting with discretion, especially when the central bank’s 
monitoring policy is uncertain to banks. Discretionary policies make liquidity provisions 
precipitate financial crises as well as worsen moral hazard problems. 
A deposit insurance corporation is not included in this analysis, but even if we were to 
include it, recall that a deposit insurance corporation is mainly concerned with its exposure to 
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the risk of having to compensate depositors following a bank failure. We concentrate on the 
role that the central bank has in deciding which bank deserve assistance, thereby minimizing 
both the probability of banking crises and the costs of liquidity provisions. Moreover, 
emphasis is shifted here from maturity transformation and liquidity insurance for small 
depositors to the “modern” form of illiquidity and insolvency in which large, well-informed 
creditors refuse to renew credit on the interbank market because the repayment capacity of an 
intermediary or a number of intermediaries is in doubt. 
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